✪ 凯文·沃什（Kevin Warsh）
美国联邦储备委员会主席
【导读】8月28日，美联储主席凯文·沃什亮相杰克逊霍尔年会，发表题为《我们所处的时代》（In Our Time）的演讲。沃什谈及美联储正在研究的若干长期议题，尤其聚焦人工智能（AI）及其可能给经济带来的变化，并反思关于“前瞻指引”的实践以及央行与金融市场之间的互动关系，提出应当指导货币政策制定的几项核心原则，也对当前经济形势作出判断。
市场认为，此次沃什讲话释放出较为鲜明的谨慎偏鹰信号。沃什认为美国经济和劳动力市场依然具有韧性，当前金融环境也很难称得上具有明显限制性，而通胀仍显著高于美联储2%的目标，因此物价问题应继续成为货币政策的首要关注点。沃什强调：“我的标准是：我们必须有信心，潜在通胀正在明确地、并以足够快的速度向我们的目标靠拢。否则，我们就还有工作要做。”对于外界批评他“坚持不给前瞻指引”的声音，沃什认为，过早向市场暗示甚至近似承诺未来的利率路径，既会束缚美联储未来根据经济变化灵活决策的空间，也会让市场过度围绕“猜美联储”交易，而不是独立判断经济基本面。他尤其警惕由此形成的“镜厅问题”——市场依据美联储指引定价，美联储又反过来参考市场价格作判断，最终可能让双方同时忽视新的经济变化。因而沃什更倾向于减少事先承诺，让市场形成自己的判断，同时由美联储依据实时数据、趋势和更稳健的政策规则，在每次真正需要决策时保持足够自由度。
本文转自“欧亚系统科学研究会”，仅代表作者本人观点，供诸君参考辨析。
我们所处的时代
▍为未来的政策环境做好准备
就在不久之前，也就是2008年金融危机前夕及其后的十年间，经济学家与政策制定者都在讨论长期停滞与全球储蓄过剩问题。当时普遍的看法是，大量资本会长期闲置，因为具备吸引力的投资机会严重不足，重大创新都已经完成，经济增长将长期低迷缓慢。时代已然巨变，我们正处在历史的转折点。最鲜明的例子就是人工智能这项已有80年称谓的新兴技术，其发展速度甚至超出了几年前技术拥趸的预期。经济实现大幅提速增长的可能性正在上升。规模持续扩张的资本正源源不断涌入各类人工智能相关基础设施，某种超摩尔定律正在上演，缩放定律也在改变创新的方式与速度。资本与人力共同打造出作为人工智能核心的大语言模型。用户通过购买算力令牌来调用模型。有报告显示，仅两大头部实验室的令牌年化销售额就超1000亿美元，同比增幅超500%。美联储正密切关注这一切。我们认识到，人工智能是一个全新变量，甚至有可能成为一类新的生产要素，会深刻影响经济运行与货币政策的制定。这引出一系列核心待解问题：人工智能的应用能否在全经济范围内带来持续、显著的生产率提升？如果可以，这一效应何时显现？算力令牌的使用，是对劳动力形成互补，还是替代劳动力？下一代人工智能模型是否会进一步提高资本密集度，还是模型本身能够催生轻量化的资本解决方案？除此之外还有诸多未知，包括最终形成的市场结构。资本回报会流向何处、以怎样的周期兑现，目前并不明朗。短期来看，稀缺资产的收益会有多大比例流向人工智能实验室、芯片厂商、能源生产商与云服务商？长期而言，这些价值又会有多少沉淀到企业与消费者手中？这对劳动者就业、美联储的就业目标会产生哪些广泛影响？同样，我们目前也不清楚算力令牌的均衡价格。会不会出现令牌分层，市场愿意支付高额费用去使用前沿顶尖模型？老旧模型的令牌价格会不会回落至边际成本水平？我们将依托生产率与就业专项工作组深入研究上述问题。我近期和该工作组以及另外四个专项小组负责人沟通，进展令人鼓舞。但需要明确的是，工作组后续提出的建议，不会影响当前阶段的政策决策。不过我相信，今天开展的这类理论储备，能让我们更好应对未来的政策挑战。
（美联储主席凯文·沃什亮相杰克逊霍尔全球央行年会并发表主题演讲）
▍前瞻指引及其替代工具
在各专项工作组推进研究的同时，我不会坐等，而是会主动推动美联储制度创新，适配新形势。举一个重点例子：我打算调整美联储主席所谓“前瞻指引”的形式与功能。大家或许知道，我长期以来不倾向于过早释放未来政策的预判。我更推崇另一种思路，接下来我会阐述理由。
针对未来政策的沟通透明度本身并非终极价值，沟通必须服务于美联储的核心使命：制定恰当的货币政策。
前瞻指引作为常规政策工具，是我和同事们在全球金融危机期间启用的。在当时的环境下，它至关重要，推出时也备受关注。但和很多危机时期遗留的工具一样，我认为它如今已经不合时宜。
在常规经济环境中，前瞻指引的作用应当被严格限定。否则，它看似追求清晰，实则容易制造模糊。过度披露政策讨论细节、过早对未来政策做出承诺，可能误导市场、企业和居民。同时我认为，如果政策制定者在经济周期中就利率做出准承诺，会束缚我们在关键节点做出正确决策的空间。
想要制定合理的政策，也必须理顺金融市场与央行之间的关系。美联储需要尽可能纯粹、未经过滤的市场信号，包括市场内部指标、各板块资产价格水平与变动、国债的价格与成交量、美元汇率、信贷成本与可得性，以及一篮子大宗商品价格。
在整个经济周期中，上述指标以及其他数据，将帮助美联储判断短期经济活动与通胀前景，同时反映整体金融环境，以及金融周期蕴含的风险与不确定性。
与此同时，市场参与者本身应当追踪实体经济真实信息，独立形成对产出、就业、通胀的预期，并高度警惕各类风险。
美联储应当保持谦逊，不能抱有天真的想法。美联储在经济与市场中扮演关键角色，政策工具威力强大，我们决定短期利率的走向，市场参与者也总会预判我们的下一步动作。但我们不能默许这样一种格局：市场参与者主要依靠美联储的信号来交易。
经济学文献早已阐释过这种机制的扭曲效应——“镜中迷宫”问题。如果市场高度依赖美联储前瞻指引，而美联储又依靠市场价格判断形势，双方都更容易忽视新的变化，难以应对局势反转，进而出现政策误判。
讽刺的是，“镜中迷宫”带来的最大代价往往不由市场参与者承担，真正承受重创的是没有金融资产的群体。如果美联储误判通胀与经济形势，谁会承受最糟糕的后果？不是金融市场的受益者，而是普通美国民众，他们要面对高通胀或是就业稳定性突然下滑的困境。
既然前瞻指引不适用于常规时期，那么新任美联储主席至少应当给出明确的反应函数吧？也就是如果经济数据过热或者走弱，应当明确利率会如何调整。
我也希望我们对经济的认知足够精准，能够给出一套成熟、机械的标准答案，比如可以完全依赖泰勒规则这类简单模型。但目前我们的认知还达不到这个程度，而且影响货币政策合理制定的核心因素会随时间变化。
通过发布预测来展示政策反应函数，理论上可行，但现实落地效果不佳，实验室里的设想很难在真实市场奏效。不少人都和我一样注意到，2021年的前瞻指引，一定程度上延缓了政策对高通胀做出反应。
在我的任期内，我和同事们会努力搭建更可靠的模型、更稳健的规则来辅助政策决策。但我们清楚，精准经济预测目前仍只是一个目标。在地缘政治、全球供应链、技术快速迭代的大背景下，我们必须清醒认识自身认知的边界。
本着同样的思路，我们应当充分吸纳各类有助于货币政策决策的观点。要实现最优决策，就不能排斥多元的经济判断。
那么，应当选择怎样更好的政策路径？接下来我会分享指导我判断货币政策合理方向的几项核心原则，之后再给出前面承诺的经济形势评估。
▍核心原则
接下来谈谈政策原则：第一，在这个领域，过往数据很容易被误读为当下现状。难点就在于分清二者的区别。也就是说，我们必须核验真实经济状况，避免基于过时、失真的数据制定前瞻性政策，也不能仅凭单一数据点下判断，趋势才最为关键。美联储是决策机构，我们在不确定性中做出选择，所依托的数据必须具备时效性、准确性、可操作性。第二，美联储政策的目标，是让经济总需求与总供给大致匹配。但我们能够直接观测到的只有经济活动，供给端的真实情况无法直接观测，只能推断。因此，评估当前及预期的供需平衡天然存在不确定性。第三，必须明确：美联储以个人消费支出（PCE）价格指数衡量的2%物价稳定目标，是坚定不变的硬性目标。同样要厘清一点：物价稳定不会自动实现，通胀也未必会自动回归均值，实现物价稳定是美联储的职责。第四，美联储同时肩负最大化就业的使命。在中期维度同时实现两大目标，并非二选一的取舍。我不认为美联储的双重使命存在内在冲突。毕竟，高通胀本身就会严重损害经济繁荣。第五，短期利率是实现双重使命的主要工具。非常规刺激政策适用于真正的危机场景，除此之外应当尽量少用，甚至不用。第六，货币至关重要。如今这个观点不算主流，但我认为货币和货币政策紧密相关。我们需要关注央行创造的货币，以及银行和金融体系派生的货币。诚然，金融创新等因素改变了基础货币、货币流通速度和宏观经济之间的传导机制，但这不代表我们可以忽视货币对金融环境与物价的最终影响。最后，美联储应当减少不必要发声，沟通更有针对性，这样才能更好完成目标。评判我们可信度的唯一标准，就是能否兑现法定职责。借用查克·耶格尔将军的一句话：“关键时刻，只有理由，或是结果。”
▍当前经济现状
基于以上原则，我如何看待当下经济？真实的现状究竟如何？
大家可以查阅7月的FOMC会议纪要，委员会达成一致判断：劳动力市场保持稳定，经济产出表现稳健，但通胀依然过高。我和绝大多数委员认为，更稳妥的做法是在两次会议之间等待新信息——尤其是供应链、资本流向、地缘局势的潜在变化，再判断是否需要调整利率政策。同时我们已经做好准备，将根据形势变化及时采取行动。
就我个人判断，当前经济整体表现亮眼，而且有所走强。衡量经济韧性的一个标准，就是经济体抵御冲击的能力。从这一点来看，实体经济与金融市场都展现出极强的韧性。
有几点观察：
作为未来经济增长基础的企业资本开支正在快速上行。设备与无形资产投资的四季度增速约9%，为2021年以来最高水平。今年过半的资本开支增量，大概率来自人工智能相关建设。
标普500成分企业的利润过去一年增幅超20%，利润率处于历史高位。整体股市波动率较低。我们会持续密切跟踪市场内部结构，关注各板块表现。
市场对资本开支和企业盈利增长的预期非常乐观。我会持续跟踪其增速变化，也就是二阶导数，同时评估其后续对资产价格、企业信心、居民收入与消费的连锁影响。
企业债与杠杆贷款的信用利差接近历史低位区间，今年这类债券发行规模十分可观。跳出固收市场，结合银行业情况，7月银行信贷官员调查显示，工商业贷款的审批标准处于历史偏宽松区间，这也解释了今年工商业贷款的增长。信贷市场几乎没有体现出政策带来的紧缩效果。
部分板块，比如房地产、农业，已经显现压力。但综合来看，很难判定整体金融环境处于紧缩状态。
尽管接连遭遇各类冲击，居民实际消费支出依然稳健，过去四个季度增幅超2%。叠加强劲的投资，国内私人最终购买（PDFP）同步走高。今年迄今为止，该指标年化增速接近3%。这一指标通常比GDP更有信号意义，其趋势同样向好。
就业端来看，美国就业市场表现良好，整体十分稳定。失业率4.1%，放在历史维度属于低位，近两年基本没有明显波动。作为一项可靠性很强的实时指标，初次失业救济申领人数的四周均值处于数十年来低位。
在我看来，当前劳动力市场流转率偏低，一定程度源于后疫情时代大规模的劳资重新匹配。
在劳动力供给增长几乎停滞的背景下，月度新增就业规模自然会偏低。劳动力市场永远存在值得担忧的领域，比如应届毕业生就业。但总体而言，有就业意愿的人群基本都能保有或是找到工作。大家或许会担忧未来就业市场波动，但就目前来看，劳动力市场符合充分就业的状态。
但在物价稳定这一使命上，数据更值得警惕。美联储偏好的通胀指标，PCE价格指数12个月同比涨幅为3.7%，6个月年化涨幅4.1%。CPI的同类指标同样偏高，PCE与CPI的核心通胀水平也居高不下。这些指标各有局限，但都指向同一个事实：通胀高于2%的目标。因此美联储当前的核心重心应当放在物价上。
政策制定者需要捕捉核心趋势通胀，也就是剔除特殊扰动因素后，经济体普遍的物价变动。我们要判断核心通胀是上行、下行，还是陷入停滞，不仅要看方向，也要看变化速度。各项主要通胀指标相比2022年峰值已经显著回落，但过去两年的改善幅度有限。
尽管今夏PCE和CPI数据好于预期，但这不足以说明核心通胀趋势出现实质性好转。
数据同时显示薪资温和增长。但长期实践证明，薪资增速并不是预判未来通胀的可靠指标。
为研判核心通胀，我会拆分PCE物价指数下199个细分项来分析。过去12个月，PCE篮子里54%的商品与服务价格涨幅超过3%。该比例远低于疫情后约77%的峰值，但仍显著高于疫情前二十年32%的均值。
仅看过去六个月，结论相近：PCE篮子中49%的商品服务年化涨幅超3%，同样低于疫情后高点，但依旧偏高。
近期大宗商品价格整体上行也需要持续关注，我们要判断这是否会带来通胀上行风险。
另外一个关键问题：过去五年多持续偏高的通胀，有没有已经固化到通胀预期之中？好消息是，中期通胀预期指标整体保持稳定，互换市场的通胀补偿数据也给出一致结论。
尤其结合近期形势，市场定价反映出各界相信美联储能够实现物价稳定，这既是美联储机构公信力的体现，也契合美联储一贯的传统。我可以向大家保证，市场的这份信心不会落空。
从历史经验来看，市场衡量的通胀预期往往看起来稳固，直到突然发生转变。这类预期不会轻易变动，目前锚定状态良好，但我们必须严密监测。美联储的核心任务，就是防止通胀预期脱锚。
有一个信号不容忽视：长达65个月的持续高通胀，责任完全在央行，这一点无可回避。
我的判断标准很明确：我们必须有十足把握，确认核心通胀正清晰、稳步向目标回落。如果达不到这个状态，我们就还有工作要做。这是我们的职责、使命，也是我们必须坚守的任务。
▍结语
今天我站在这里，恪守一套政策准则，而非固守某一项既定决策。
我和美联储的同事们，并不是第一批在重大历史节点承担这份职责的人。我们决心全力以赴，不负时代。
我们怀着谦逊与坚定，认真履行这份重任。诸多大事都取决于我们的决策。稳健的货币政策能够助力家庭与企业繁荣。有效落地的货币政策，可以增强美国经济内生动力，巩固美国在全球的领导力。我深知，国家需要我们审慎思考、明智决策。
能够再次在美联储任职，是极大的荣幸。我由衷感谢同事以及在场各位给予的支持与宝贵建议。感谢大家今天上午的聆听。
英文原文（向上滑动查看）：
Thank you. It's great to be here again and to see so many familiar faces. I've been looking forward to this weekend—what better place to mark my 100th day as Chairman?
For the fine hospitality, everyone here is in debt to President Jeff Schmid and his colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Jeff, our thanks to you all.
Jeff and the other planners have some recreation options lined up for later today. And I'd advise you to be very careful with your choices.
As I learned years ago, you can take two different kinds of hikes on the trails around Jackson Hole. I can sum up my hikes with former Vice Chairman Don Kohn in two words: I survived. These steely marathon death marches revealed a side of Don I wasn't ready for.
There's another kind of hike—one I associate with Chairman Ben Bernanke, my old colleague. With Ben, it's a much more leisurely pace, an easy stroll along the wandering trails at the Rockefeller Preserve.
So before setting out, do a wellness check and ask yourself: "Is this a Kohn day or a Bernanke day?"
The best thing about this gathering is that it helps us all clear our minds and think straight about our world and our time. For me, it feels like the right place, and the right audience, for a real engagement with the ideas that matter most.
Innovation is the conference theme, and I believe that the public and the markets—in their collective wisdom—understand that innovations in the conduct of policy at the Fed will help deliver price stability alongside full employment.
Here is a quick overview of what I'll cover in my remarks this morning. You can call it an outline . . . you can call it a trail map . . . just don't call it forward guidance.
First, I'll touch on a few of the longer-term questions we're asking at the Fed about the latest general-purpose technology, artificial intelligence (AI), and where it might take the economy.
Then I'll reflect a bit on the practice of forward guidance and the interaction between the central bank and financial markets.
Next, I'll present some of the key principles that I believe should guide the conduct of monetary policy.
And, finally, I'll give you my assessment of the economy.
Preparing for Future Policy Conjunctures
With the unchanging picture of the Tetons as our backdrop, we are here to survey an economic landscape that is anything but static.
It wasn't so long ago—in the run-up to the crisis of 2008 and over the decade that followed—when economists and policymakers were speaking of secular stagnation and a global saving glut.It was a widely held view that an excess of capital would sit on the sidelines for a long, long time, because there just wouldn't be enough compelling investment opportunities. All the good stuff had been invented. So growth would be low and slow.
Well, times sure have changed. We've come to a hinge point in history.
To cite the clearest example, progress in artificial intelligence—the 80-year-old name for the newest technology—has been faster even than its evangelists predicted a couple of years ago.
The potential for substantially higher growth is on the rise. Ever-expanding pools of capital are pouring into AI-related infrastructure of all sorts. A kind of hyper–Moore's law seems to be playing out. Scaling laws, too, are changing both the method and speed of innovation.
Capital and labor have combined to create the large language models at the heart of AI. Users buy tokens to gain access to the models. Reports put annualized token sales for the two leading labs alone at more than $100 billion—an increase of 500-plus percent from a year ago.
The Fed watches all of this attentively. We recognize that AI is a new variable—potentially a new factor of production—that will have consequences for both the economy and the conduct of monetary policy. It opens some major lines of inquiry:
Will the application of AI cause a significant, sustained rise in productivity across the economy? And if so, when?
Will token usage be complementary or competitive to labor? Will the next generation of AI models demand even greater capital intensity, or will the models themselves help devise a capital-light solution?
Among the other yet unknowns is the resulting market structure. It's not obvious where the returns on capital will land or on what timescale. Early on, how much of the surplus goes to owners of scarce assets—AI labs, chipmakers, energy producers, and cloud providers? Over time, how much of that value accrues to businesses and consumers? What are the broad implications for workers and for the employment side of the Fed's mandate?
Likewise, we don't yet know the equilibrium price of the tokens. Might there be a heterogeneity of tokens, such that growing sums will be paid for access to the best models at the frontier? Will token prices for older models fall to the level of their marginal cost?
We will be thinking through these matters with the help of a task force on productivity and jobs. My early check-ins with the leaders of that task force, and the four others, have been encouraging.
To be clear, though, their recommendations will come later and have no bearing on decisions we make in the current policy conjuncture. But I believe that for future policy challenges, this intellectual investment today will leave us far better prepared.
Forward Guidance and Its Stand-ins
As our task forces go about their work, I am not waiting to introduce innovations at the Fed to make us fit for purpose. To highlight one example, I have set out to change the form and function of the Fed Chairman's so-called forward guidance. You might know about my long-time discomfort with early pronouncements of future policy decisions. I much prefer another path . . . and will make the case for it.
Transparency in communications about future policy decisions is not a virtue unto itself. Communications must be in service to the Fed's paramount responsibility: getting monetary policy right.
Forward guidance as a regular practice was adopted by my colleagues and me during the Global Financial Crisis.It was essential at the time, and we introduced it with much fanfare. But, as with other legacies of crises past, I believe that the practice has overstayed its welcome.
In normal times, the role of forward guidance should be limited and circumscribed. Otherwise it risks creating ambiguity in the name of clarity. Oversharing policy deliberations and overcommitting to future decisions can lead markets, businesses, and households astray.7And I believe when policymakers make quasi-commitments on interest rates through the cycle, we inhibit our own freedom to make the right calls when it's time to decide.
To get policy right, we also need to get the relationship right between financial markets and the central bank. The Fed needs clear market signals, as unfiltered as possible . . . from market internals . . . the level and change in asset prices across sectors . . . the prices and trading volumes of Treasury securities. . . the foreign exchange value of the dollar . . . the cost and availability of credit . . . and the price of a broad set of commodities.
These and other indicators should inform the Fed's near-term outlook on economic activity and inflation throughout the business cycle. They should also reveal the state of broader financial conditions . . . and the risks and uncertainties in the financial cycle.
At the same time, market participants themselves should be tracking real information across the economy. They should draw their own conclusions; form their own expectations of output, employment, and inflation; and stay sharply attuned to risks.
The Fed should be humble and never naïve. The Fed plays an essential role in the economy and the markets. And our tools are powerful. We determine the path of short-term interest rates. And market participants will always try to anticipate what we will do next. But we should not indulge a regime in which market participants are looking primarily to the Fed for their next trade.
The economic literature has long described the distorting effects: a hall-of-mirrors problem.If markets rely materially on the Fed's guidance and the Fed relies on market prices, we are all more likely to be blinded to new developments . . . more likely to be caught unprepared for a turn of events . . . and more likely to commit errors in policymaking.
Perversely, market participants are unlikely to bear the biggest costs of the hall-of-mirrors problem. The most serious harm is likely to befall those without financial assets. If the Fed gets inflation wrong and judges the economy wrong, who gets the worst of it? Not the financial high-fliers. Hard-working Americans are the ones left to deal with inflation that is too high or jobs that suddenly appear less secure.
So, if forward guidance is ill-suited to normal times, then how about the new Fed chief commits—at the very least—to an explicit reaction function? Surely, he should tell us his interest rate path—if, say, the data were to come in hot or cold.
I wish our understanding of the economy were so precise as to provide a mechanical, tried-and-true answer—that some simple function like a Taylor rule could be rigorously relied upon. But our knowledge just doesn't extend that far—at least not yet—and the factors most relevant to the proper conduct of monetary policy change over time.
Providing forecasts to illustrate the Fed's reaction function works better in theory than in practice, better in the lab than in the field. I'm not alone in noticing that forward guidance in 2021, to cite one example, might well have slowed the policy response to high inflation.
In my term as Chairman, my colleagues and I will endeavor to construct more reliable models and more robust rules to guide policy decisions. We'll do this knowing that accuracy in economic forecasting is still just an aspiration. With so much changing so fast in geopolitics, global supply chains, and technology, it's wise to be modest about what we can and cannot know.
In the same spirit, we should receive the full range of ideas on matters that may inform the Fed's monetary policy decisions. If the aim is optimal decisionmaking, we should not crowd out views on the economy.
How, then, to chart a better path to policy? In the balance of my remarks, I will share some key principles that guide my thinking on the appropriate conduct of monetary policy . . . then offer my promised assessment of the economy.
Key Principles
Turning to principles . . .
First, I've noticed that, in this line of work, yesterday's news has a way of getting mistaken for what is happening right now. The challenge is to know the difference. In other words, we must interrogate reality to make sure we are not setting forward-looking policy based on stale or inaccurate data. Nor should we rely on isolated data points. Trends matter most. The Fed is a decisionmaking agency. We make choices amid uncertainty, and the data upon which we draw must be as relevant, contemporaneous, accurate, and actionable as possible.
Second, the Federal Reserve's actions are intended to ensure that the aggregate demand side of the economy is broadly consistent with aggregate supply. However, all we observe directly is activity. We never see, and can only infer, what's really happening on the supply side. Hence, evaluating the current and expected balance between aggregate supply and demand is imprecise.
Third, there should be no misunderstanding: The Fed's price-stability objective of 2 percent, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, is a firm, fixed target. Let's be equally clear about another aspect of the objective: Price stability is not self-executing, nor is inflation necessarily mean-reverting. It is the Fed's job to deliver stable prices.
Fourth, the Fed also bears responsibility for maximum employment. Achieving both sides of our mandate over the medium term is not an either/or proposition. I do not believe that the Fed's dual mandate works at cross-purposes. After all, high inflation itself is very harmful to economic prosperity.
Fifth, short-term interest rates are the predominant tool to achieve the dual mandate. Unconventional policies to spur economic activity may suit genuine crises but should otherwise be used sparingly, if at all.
Sixth, money matters. It's not fashionable these days, but my view is that money has something important to do with monetary policy.We should pay attention to money created by the central bank and money that comes from the banking and financial systems.It's true that financial innovations and other factors alter the mechanics that link the monetary base, the velocity of money, and the broader economy. But that is scarcely a reason to ignore the ultimate effects of money on financial conditions and prices.
Finally, a quieter Fed, more purposeful in its communications, is better able to meet its objectives. And we can be held accountable for delivering on our remit—the only true test of our credibility. To borrow a line from General Chuck Yeager, "At the moment of truth, there are either reasons or results."
The Economy Today
Now, given these principles, how do I read the economy today? What's really going on outside the window?
You may have read in the July minutes the unanimous view of the FOMC:Labor markets were stable, and output was solid. But inflation remained too high. A good majority of my colleagues and I thought the wiser course was to await new information in the intermeeting period—especially given possible developments in supply chains, investment flows, and geopolitics—before deciding whether a change in interest rate policy was advisable. And we expressed our joint readiness to act as circumstances might require.
For my part, today I am impressed by the overall performance of the economy, which appears to have strengthened. One indicator of strength is how well an economy holds up to shocks. On that score, both Main Street and Wall Street have been remarkably resilient.
Several observations:
Business capital expenditures—the seed corn of future economic growth—are rising rapidly. The four-quarter change in investment in equipment and intangibles has been around 9 percent, its highest growth rate since 2021. More than half of the cap-ex growth this year can likely be ascribed to the buildout related to AI.
For firms in the S&P 500, profits have grown by more than 20 percent over the past year. Profit margins are quite elevated, relative to history. Overall equity market volatility is low. We're staying keenly focused on market internals, watching performance across sectors.
Expectations for growth in both cap-ex and corporate earnings are running quite high. I will continue to watch the change in their growth rates, the second derivative. The follow-on effects on asset prices, business confidence, consumer income, and spending are equally important to gauge.
Credit spreads on corporate bonds and leveraged loans are near the low ends of their historical ranges, and issuance volumes in these markets have been quite strong this year. Looking beyond fixed-income markets to the banking business, in the July Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, banks tell us that standards for commercial and industrial loans are on the easier end of their historical range. That helps explain the growth we've seen this year in those loans. Credit and loan markets are showing few signs of policy restraint.
Certain sectors—like housing and agriculture—are showing strains. But, on balance, I would be hard pressed to describe broad financial conditions as restrictive.
Real consumer spending has been healthy despite the shocks, increasing more than 2 percent over the past four quarters. Combining consumption with the brisk investment we've observed, private domestic final purchases (PDFP) has also risen. PDFP has increased at a pace of nearly 3 percent so far this calendar year. That's a measure that typically carries more signal than gross domestic product, and the trend here too is positive.
On the employment side of the Fed's dual mandate, our country is doing well. Labor markets are quite stable. The jobless rate, at 4.1 percent, remains low by historical standards and has not changed much for a couple of years. Unemployment claims, on a four-week average—an empirically robust real-time indicator—are near their lowest level in decades.
In my view, the relatively low turnover in today's labor market is partly a result of the significant rematching between employers and employees that happened at scale in the post-pandemic environment.
When labor supply is barely growing, monthly job gains are naturally going to run low. There are always areas of concern in the labor market—for example, among recent graduates. In general, though, people who want to work, by and large, are holding or finding jobs. They may well be concerned about possible future labor disruptions, but as of now, I believe the labor markets are consistent with full employment.
But on the price-stability side of our mandate, the numbers are more concerning. The Fed's preferred measure of inflation, the 12-month change in the PCE price index, stands at 3.7 percent, while the six-month change is 4.1 percent. The comparable measures from the consumer price index (CPI) are also elevated, as are the core measures of both PCE and CPI inflation. None of these measures are perfect, but they all tell a similar story: Inflation is running above our 2 percent target. So the Fed's predominant focus right now should be on prices.
The job for policymakers is to capture underlying trend inflation—that is, the generalized change in prices in the economy, unaffected by idiosyncratic factors. We want to gauge whether underlying inflation is rising, falling, or stuck in place. We also want to understand not just the direction of travel, but also the speed. Each of these broad inflation measures has fallen significantly from their 2022 heights. But progress over the past two years has been modest.
And while this summer's PCE and CPI readings were better than expected, they do not tell me that underlying trends have meaningfully improved.
The data also show moderate wage growth. But in tracking underlying inflation, wage growth has not proven a reliable indicator of future inflation for a very long time.
To try to gauge underlying inflation, I find it instructive to disaggregate the 199 individual components of the PCE price measure. Over the past 12 months, 54 percent of goods and services in the PCE basket showed price increases above 3 percent. This is well below the post-pandemic highs of about 77 percent, but it remains well above the level of 32 percent in the two decades that preceded the pandemic.
Looking over just the past six months, the conclusion is similar: Of goods and services in the PCE basket, 49 percent showed annualized price increases above 3 percent. Again, this is well below the post-pandemic highs but still quite elevated.
The recent rise in overall commodity prices also bears watching. What we need to judge is whether trends indicate upside inflation risks.
It matters, too, whether the inflation readings of the past five-plus years have seeped into expectations. The good news is that measures of inflation expectations in the medium term, by and large, look stable. And inflation compensation measures from the swaps market send a strong and similar message.
Especially in light of recent developments, it is a credit to the Fed as an institution—and consistent with the best of the Fed's traditions—that market prices show confidence that we will deliver price stability. And I can assure you . . . they're right.
The thing about market measures of inflation expectations in economic history is that they tend to look strong and durable until they don't. Those expectations are not pushed around easily, and right now they are well anchored. But they must be closely minded. It's the Fed's job to make sure that inflation expectations do not get unanchored.
There is one signal nobody can miss: The responsibility for 65 months of sustained, elevated inflation sits squarely with the central bank. And that is where it belongs.
Here is my standard: We must be confident that underlying inflation is moving to our objective, clearly and at sufficient speed. Otherwise, we have work to do. That's our job . . . our mandate . . . and our charge to keep.
Conclusion
I stand here today committed to a discipline, not to a decision.
My Fed colleagues and I are hardly the first to hold these positions in a time of great consequence. We are determined to redeem the time by doing our very best work.
We take our responsibility seriously, with humility and with resolve. So much depends on choices we make. Sound monetary policy helps households and businesses to prosper. When carried out effectively, it broadens and deepens the momentum of our economy . . . and helps to secure America's leadership in the world. And I know that our country needs us to think carefully and act wisely.
It is a tremendous honor to serve once again at the Federal Reserve. I am truly grateful for the encouragement and good counsel I've received from my colleagues . . . and from so many of you in this room. For that, and for your kind attention this morning, I thank you.
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