兰德智库《大国战争的回归——美中之间系统性冲突模式》 第二章(中英对照)

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陶勇翻译 兰德智库《大国战争的回归——美中之间系统性冲突模式》 第二章(中英对照) 图片来源为网络,非报告原图。 CHAPT'...

陶勇翻译 兰德智库《大国战争的回归——美中之间系统性冲突模式》 第二章(中英对照)



CHAPTER TWOGeopolitical and Military Trends476品论天涯网

第二章 地缘政治和军事趋势476品论天涯网

A starting point for analyzing potential U.S.-China systemic conflict is to describe such a strategic environment as well as we can. No one can know what the future holds, but we can perhaps narrow the range of possibilities by outlining some of the most plausible features. we focus on key geopolitical and military trends, as identified by both Chinese and Western analysts. In each section we describe a trend and consider some of its implica-tions for potential U.S.- China systemic conflict. As much as possible, we include both West-ern academic estimates that underpin each identified trend and Chinese sources that discuss similar trends. We then modify the analysis with assumptions to better accord with our focus on potential U.S.-China conflict scenarios.476品论天涯网


Geopolitical Trends476品论天涯网


Several key geopolitical trends that are anticipated to endure for several decades could carry significant implications for scenarios of potential U.S.- China systemic conflict. These trends include the decline of the developed world and rise of the developing world; growing inter-national fragmentation and disorder; competition for resources and markets; the evolution of the global economy; the transition to multipolarity; and elevated risks from great power competition. For each trend, we consider evidence noted by Chinese and Western sources. We then explore the implications for our hypothetical scenario of U.S.-China conflict.476品论天涯网


Shifting Global Balance of Power476品论天涯网


Chinese and Western scholars have noted broad international trends in global power that will likely shift away from the industrialized West, which has dominated world politics for much of modern history. The collective rise of the developing non-West and the shrinking share of global economic power of the West open the possibility that China could grow powerful enough to contend for global primacy. These broad trends also shape and constrain U.S. options for defending its international position. Looking only at the economic dimension of national power, a 2017 study by Pricewater-house Coopers asserts, for example, that by 2050 the developed nations in the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) could see their share of world gross domestic product (GDP) fall to 20 percent, while those of an emerging seven” (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey) could exceed 50 percent of world GDP, adjusted for purchasing power parity. RAND researchers have highlighted similar possible geostrategic trends, including the polarization and retrenchment of the United States; a stronger China that is causing other states, particularly in Asia, to con-sider whether to bandwagon with or balance against China’s rise; a revanchist Russia; and a less united and weaker Europe.476品论天涯网



Chinese scholars regard such trends as carrying tremendous historical significance. They acknowledge that the shift in global power from the developed world toward the develop-ing world could result in greater short-term international instability but could also unveil unprecedented opportunities for China in the long term. Chen Xiangyang, a professor at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argues in a 2020 paper that strategic trends favoring the rise of China and the East and the “decline of the West” have “accelerated.” He notes the failure of Europe and the United States to solve many pressing global problems and underscores the reality of their waning power.476品论天涯网

An article by the deputy dean of Renmin University’s School of International Studies, Fang Changping, has similarly judged that world politics and the global economy have “entered a new stage of flux.” He cites as key reasons the relative decline of American power and “rising populism and nationalism, the resurgence of strong-man and identity politics, and imbalanced economic development,” which, he asserts, have “eroded people’s identities and loyalties attached to the nation-state” and “intensified economic and geopolitical conflicts.”476品论天涯网

Many Chinese scholars judge that the receding strength of the West provides an oppor-tunity for China to grow its influence with countries that are receptive to its model of gov-ernance and development. As Yang Jiemian, a scholar at the Shanghai Institutes for Inter-national Studies, observes, “There is a disconnect between countries’ commitments to the construction and reform of international mechanisms and their implementation. China hopes to be at the forefront of bridging this gap.” Yang notes that major non-Western countries have “increased their political awareness and self-confidence” and concludes that China’s “social-ism with Chinese characteristics” could appeal to countries that wish to accelerate develop-ment with a minimum of dependence on the United States.476品论天涯网

Chinese scholars, according to several Western observers, generally appear increasingly hopeful about prospects for shaping the international order over the long term. In sum, this trend provides the fundamental basis for the possibility that China could near the point of contending directly for international leadership. Although far from certain and perhaps unlikely owing to China’s many weaknesses, the possibility cannot be ruled out. This sets up a key assumption of the scenario, which is that China has become strong enough that it is willing to risk conflict with the United States to secure its position as the top global power.476品论天涯网

中国学者住处这些趋势具有巨大的历史意义。他们认为全球权力从发达国家向发展中国家的转移可能会导致短期内国际局势极不稳定,但从长远来看,也会为中国带来前所未有的机遇。中国现代国际关系研究院教授陈向阳在2020年的一篇论文中论证:有利于中国和东方崛起以及 “西方衰落”的战略趋势已经 “加速”。他指出欧洲和美国未能解决许多紧迫的全球问题,进而强调欧美力量减弱的现实。476品论天涯网

中国人民大学国际关系学院副院长方长平的一篇文章也同样判断,世界政治和全球经济已经 “进入一个新的变化阶段”。他列举了美国实力的相对下降和民粹主义和民族主义的崛起,强人政治和身份政治的重新出现,以及不平衡的经济发展 作为关键原因,他断言,这些因素 “削弱了人们对民族国家的认同和忠诚”,并 “加剧了经济和地缘政治冲突 ”。476品论天涯网

许多中国学者认为,西方力量的消退为中国提供了一个机会——对那些愿意接受中国发展模式的国家施加扩大影响。正如上海国际问题研究所学者杨洁勉所言:“各国对国际机制建设和改革的承诺与实施之间存在脱节。中国希望在弥合这一差距方面走在前列。” 杨洁勉指出,主要的非西方国家已经 “提高了他们的政治意识和自信”,并得出结论,中国的 “中国特色社会主义 ”可以吸引那些希望尽量不依赖美国加速发展的国家。476品论天涯网


Increasing International Fragmentation and Disorder476品论天涯网


A symptom of an international system in transition away from a U.S.-led unipolarity is its increasing fragmentation and disorder, a trend recognized by both Chinese and West-ern analysts.The 2019 reportChina’s National Defense in the New Erastates that “global and regional security issues are on the increase.” It cites problems of eroding international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament efforts, the intensification of arms races in Asia and other regions, the spread of extremism and terrorism, and the increase in non-traditional security threats involving cybersecurity, biosecurity, and piracy.A report from the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence similarly anticipates a more uncertain and fractured international order and describes an evolving international order that features “uncertainty about the United States, an inward-looking West, and erosion of norms for con-flict prevention and human rights.”476品论天涯网

Increasing international fragmentation poses both challenges and opportunities to China. Beijing has already had to confront the reality of internal breakdown in some of its partner countries. The PLA Navy sent a frigate to safeguard evacuees in Libya in 2011, and the PLA conducted a larger noncombatant evacuation operation in Yemen in 2015 for more than five hundred citizens of various countries. Chinese officials have had to grapple with persis-tent civil strife in key BRI partner countries such as Pakistan. Chinese articles have also pointed to the dangers posed by the Syrian civil war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, unrest in Africa, and the Iran nuclear issue, all of which pose some level of threat to Chinese energy sources, markets, and natural resources.476品论天涯网

国际体系从美国主导的单极化转型的趋势特征是日益分裂和无序,这是中国和西方分析家都承认的现实。“2019年中国新时代的国防 ”报告指出,“全球和区域安全问题正在增加。”报告列举了国际军控、防扩散和裁军努力受到侵蚀,亚洲和其他地区的军备竞赛加剧,极端主义和恐怖主义蔓延,以及涉及网络安全、生物安全和海盗行径的非传统安全威胁增加等问题。美国国家情报局局长办公室的一份报告也同样指出更加不确定和分裂的国际秩序,并描述了不断变化的国际秩序,其特点是 “对美国的不确定性、对内向的西方和预防冲突和人权规范的‘侵蚀’。”476品论天涯网


In the Asia-Pacific, Chinese analysts have argued that rising regional competition between China and the United States is likely to result in increased regional instability. To illustrate, scholars point out that China’s neighbors such as India and Japan attach importance to economic cooperation with China while simul-taneously deepening security ties to the United States. They also note that regional con-frontations, such as those involving North and South Korea, remain complex, featuring the involvement of several great powers and other regional powers. Chinese analysts also assess that regional hot spot issues remain contentious and that the risks of conflict in the India-Pakistan disputes and those regarding the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan may have increased.476品论天涯网

But China, Russia, and others have also taken advantage of greater international disorder to secure gains. In 2022, Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine. China and Russia in particular have successfully advanced their interests through measures short of war, also known asgray zone operations. A recent RAND report notes that adversary use of gray zone tactics through paramilitary forces and emerging military and communications technologies can destabilize states with increasing ease.476品论天涯网



The fragmentation of the international order shapes the future operational environment in which U.S.-China conflict might emerge. It creates greater uncertainty and therefore increases the risks of miscalculation. The exacerbation of long-standing security issues, the spread of diverse threats, and the weakness of global governance mechanisms raise the pros-pect that nontraditional and traditional threats could overlap and aggravate one another, a trend already well demonstrated in the case of Syria, where civil conflict, fueled by mass migra-tion owing in part to the effects of climate change, has intensified interstate feuding between Russia and the United States.476品论天涯网

In the future, China’s deepening involvement with troubled states along BRI routes raises the possibility of conflict scenarios that arise, perhaps suddenly, from unexpected sources. Escalation in such volatile and confusing situations may become unpre-dictable. Tensions, crises, and conflict involving Chinese- and U.S.-backed forces could occur within the context of nontraditional threats and issues that complicate and aggravate conflict tendencies. In this analysis, the United States may need to find ways of responding to tradi-tional and nontraditional threats even as it manages a systemic conflict with China.476品论天涯网


今后,中国与 “一带一路 ”沿线问题国家关系日益加深,这就增加了冲突的可能性,这些冲突可能是突然发生的,来自意想不到的地方。在这种动荡和混乱的情况下,冲突的升级可能变得不可预测。涉及中国和美国分别支持的军事组织之紧张局势、危机和冲突可能发生在非传统威胁和问题的背景下,这些威胁和问题使冲突趋势复杂化和恶化。在这种分析中,美国可能需要找到应对传统和非传统威胁的方法,使其有助于管理与中国的系统性冲突。476品论天涯网

Competition for Resources and Markets476品论天涯网


Another geopolitical trend that could affect conflict scenarios involving China and the United States concerns the competition for resources and markets. China’s ability to garner natural resources as its energy demand continues to grow could influence its military opera-tions abroad. According to a 2016 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) report, energy security will remain a major concern for most countries, with large resource deposits located in unstable regions of the world. The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects that global energy demand will increase 50 percent by 2050, with demand led by growth in Asia. This will likely result in competition for resources, which in turn will lead to instabilities in different regions, from the Arctic to the Middle East and from South America to the South China Sea.476品论天涯网

In addition to energy, the increase in technical and electronic products requir-ing rare earth minerals has created another area of competition, such that countries willing to endure the high environmental costs of recovering them could manipulate access to the minerals for coercive purposes, as China has done in the past. Of the 33 minerals that the U.S. Department of the Interior listed in February 2018 as essential to the U.S. economy, China was the top producer of 19 and the top supplier of 12. Competition for energy is another trend that will likely persist for the foreseeable future. China currently imports oil and gas from more than 40 countries. In 2019 China imported approximately 10.1 million barrels per day of crude oil, which met approximately 77 per-cent of its needs, and China’s imports of natural gas could grow from 23.8 percent in 2021 to 46 percent by 2035.476品论天涯网



Most of China’s oil and natural gas imports come primarily from Africa, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Russia. Beijing has become adept at intertwin-ing its search for diverse sources of energy to support its economic development with its desire to increase political and economic influence. The clearest example of this is the BRI, Xi Jinping’s ambitious project aimed at linking China to more than 60 countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Oceania through infrastructure projects, energy cooperation, and tech-nology deals. Through the BRI, China has increased overland oil supply via pipelines from Kazakhstan and Russia. In 2019 approximately 34 percent of China’s natural gas imports came from Turkmenistan via a pipeline that runs through Kazakhstan and Uzbeki-stan.476品论天涯网

While China has sought to diversify energy suppliers and reduce dependency on stra-tegic choke points, it will continue to rely on sea lines of communication (SLOC) such as the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca for most of its hydrocarbon deliveries. The large volume of oil and natural gas imported from Africa and the Middle East will make securing strategic SLOC a priority for China for at least the next 15 years. In 2019, approximately 77 percent of China’s oil imports and 10 percent of its natural gas imports transited the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.476品论天涯网

中国的大部分石油和天然气进口主要来自非洲、中亚、波斯湾和俄罗斯。中国善于把寻找不同能源来源以支持其经济发展与提高政治和经济影响力相结合。最明显的例子就是 “一带一路”,这是习近平雄心勃勃的项目,旨在通过基础设施项目、能源合作和技术交易将中国与亚洲、非洲、欧洲和大洋洲60多个国家联系起来。通过一带一路,中国经由哈萨克斯坦和俄罗斯的石油管道增加了陆路供应。2019年,中国约34%的天然气进口来自土库曼斯坦,中国还通过一条穿越哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的管道从土库曼斯坦进口石油。476品论天涯网

虽然中国一直在寻求能源供应商的多样化,并减少对海峡咽喉的依赖,但目前还不得不继续通过海上交通线(Sea lines of communication)如南中国海和马六甲海峡来运送大部分的碳氢化合物。从非洲和中东进口的大量石油和天然气将使确保战略性Sea lines of communication成为中国至少未来15年的优先事项。2019年,中国约77%的石油进口和10%的天然气进口都经过南海和马六甲海峡。476品论天涯网

China’s energy security interests extend to the Arctic region. China has invested in the Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline and financed the liquid national gas project in Yamal.This, combined with the opening of the Northern Sea Route, has provided the foundation for future energy cooperation between China and Russia. China’s Polar Silk Road, part of the BRI, is expected to serve as a vehicle for increased Sino-Russian investment and coopera-tion, in building Arctic infrastructure to support commercial transit and resource exploration along the Northern Sea Route.476品论天涯网

Competition for natural resources and energy will likely persist even if China and the United States were to escalate their rivalry into conflict. Efforts to control access to vital resources could overlap and exacerbate related crises and wars, especially in countries hold-ing important energy reserves, such as those in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and possibly the Arctic regions. China’s desire to ensure secure supplies could conflict with demands by U.S. allies and partners for access to the same resources. The result could be mutually reinforcing sources of tension and fighting, which could add another layer of intrac-table conflict to a U.S.-China systemic war.476品论天涯网

中国的能源安全利益延伸至北极地区。中国投资了 “西伯利亚之力 ”天然气管道,并为亚马尔的国家液态天然气项目提供资金。再加上北方海路的开通,为中俄两国未来的能源合作奠定了基础。中国的 “极地丝绸之路 “是 “一带一路 ”的一部分,预计将成为增加中俄投资和合作的工具。在建设北极基础设施以支持北海航道沿线的商业运输和资源勘探方面,中国也在努力。476品论天涯网


China’s Growing Leadership in the Global Economy476品论天涯网


As has been noted, the evolution of the global economy is expected to feature the growing strength of developing countries and receding strength of the industrialized West. Experts have described how the world economy may rely more on China and developing countries for future growth. Chinese sources in particular have highlighted the importance of the BRI, the massive Chinese-led trade and investment infrastructure project connecting Africa, Eur-asia, and parts of Latin America. Both a Nineteenth Party Congress report and a 2019 foreign policy white paper promote a new version of globalization centered on the BRI. Although BRI projects have come under considerable criticism for their role in encouraging unsustain-able debt and other problems, most Western experts agree that the future evolution of the global economy will likely feature a larger role for emerging economies, many of which are BRI partners.476品论天涯网

The World Bank estimates that implementation of major BRI projects could increase global trade by 1.7 to 6.2 percent and raise world incomes by 0.7 to 2.9 percent. But a world economy that features greater Chinese leadership could face its own challenges. China and other countries may need to commit military resources to help manage the secu-rity challenges posed by disorder and fragmentation in the developing world. Future growth also faces challenges from economy-related issues. The Nineteenth Party Congress report, for example, notes that the “gap between rich and poor countries continues to widen.” It also observes that global economic growth has remained slow. Western scholars have simi-larly highlighted trends toward imbalanced global economic development and inequality, slowing growth, a reduction in the economic interdependence that has traditionally served as a restraint on interstate violence, and weakened norms and international institutions.476品论天涯网



Although the global economy could experience deceleration and fragmentation, interna-tional commerce would still depend on vital SLOC and maritime trade routes. China’s over-seas trade will continue to depend on several major commercial shipping routes that pass by regions such as the Bay of Bengal, the North Sea, the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and potentially the Arctic. China has long had concerns about the vulnerability of mari-time trade routes to piracy. The BRI’s Maritime Silk Road, which seeks to better connect China and open new trade routes through strategic access to global ports and waterways, will also create maritime vulnerabilities such as greater exposure to piracy and terrorism.The increasing importance of digital services and technologies means that infrastructure for information technology could also become a more important aspect of the global economy. As but one example of the increasing importance of the digital economy, China’s digital pay-ments accounted for 40 percent of the world total and were worth US $790 billion in 2016.476品论天涯网

Although the future expansion of the digital economy is constrained by a large rural work-force that cannot be easily absorbed into the digital economy, cyberspace will likely remain important for China’s economic security. China’s role in leading the “new economic globalization” centered on BRI provides a strong incentive for its military to increase efforts to build military partnerships with clients. The PLA could increase operations to counter nontraditional threats and help build partner capacity in select countries in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, as well as along maritime routes through the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The Arctic region could play a more important role in global commerce, raising the risk of militarization in that area. U.S. allies and partners may find themselves in disputes with Chinese client states, which could result in proxy conflicts between China and the United States. The overlap of resources and markets with BRI routes suggests that prospects for conflict could be higher in all these areas.476品论天涯网

尽管全球经济可能经历减速和“分裂“,但国际商业仍将依赖至关重要的海上交通线和海上贸易路线。中国的海外贸易将继续依赖几条主要的商业航道,这些航道经过的地区包括孟加拉湾、北海、南海、马六甲海峡,以及潜在的北极地区。长期以来,中国一直担心海上贸易路线容易受到海盗的侵害。金砖国家的 “海上丝绸之路 “旨在通过对全球港口和水路的战略进入,更好地连接中国并开辟新的贸易路线,这也把海上运输线的脆弱性更多地暴露给海盗攻击和恐怖袭击。数字服务和技术的重要性日益增加,则意味着信息技术的基础设施可能成为全球经济的更重要方面。这只是说明数字经济日益重要的例子,中国的数字支付占世界总额的40%,2016年价值7900亿美元。476品论天涯网

虽然数字经济的未来发展受到大量农村劳动力的制约,而这些劳动力不容易被数字经济所吸收,但网络空间对中国的经济安全可能仍然很重要。中国在领导以金砖国家为中心的 “新经济全球化 “中的作用,为其军方提供了强大的动力,使其加大与客户建立军事伙伴关系的力度。中国人民解放军可以在非洲、中东、南亚、东南亚以及印度洋和南中国海的海上航线上增加应对非传统威胁的行动,帮助合作伙伴建立能力。北极地区可能在全球商业中发挥更重要的作用,提高该地区军事化的风险。美国的盟友和伙伴可能会发现自己与中国的客户国发生争端,这可能导致中国和美国之间的代理冲突。资源和市场与金砖路线的重叠表明,在所有这些领域,冲突的前景可能会更大。476品论天涯网

Shifts in International Partnerships476品论天涯网


Although Western countries may, in general, see their collective share of world GDP decline while that of the developing world increases, major developed countries are expected to con-tinue to remain key players in the future world order. Both Chinese and Western sources agree that the world is moving away from a unipolar system dominated by the United States. However, they continue to debate what might come next. Chinese analysts anticipate the advent of an international system characterized by multipolarity. Fang Changping defines multipolarity as “power distributed more evenly among the major countries and an increased willingness on the part of major countries to act independently of the United States.” Chi-nese scholars and others perceive multipolarity as providing China more freedom to maneu-ver while decreasing vulnerability to hostile action by the United States.476品论天涯网

Multipolarity is also viewed as one of the driving forces behind the reshaping of an international system that China views as primarily dominated by and benefiting the United States. As Yang Jiemian observes, “The multipolarization of international power has been a long-term, historical process of development that is only beginning to see the gradual balancing of international influence between the East and the West in sectors long dominated solely by Western powers, including economy, politics, science and technology, culture, education, and public opinion.” Western scholars have also noted the fragmenting of Western power and the increasing might of rising major powers around the world. Analysts no longer regard the prospect of a postunipolar world as implausible and instead debate the implications of a world characterized by bipolar-ity, multipolarity, or with “no hegemon.”476品论天涯网

尽管西方国家在世界GDP中的份额总体上可能下降,而发展中国家份额会增加,但主要的发达国家预计将继续在未来的世界秩序中扮演关键角色。中国和西方消息来源都认为,世界正在脱离由美国主导的单极体系。然而,他们继续探讨接下来会发生什么。中国的分析家们预计,一个以多极化为特征的国际体系将出现。方昌平将多极化定义为 “权力在主要国家之间分配得更均匀,主要国家更愿意独立于美国行事。” 中国学者和其他人认为,多极化使中国在国际关系中“游刃有余”,同时减弱了美国针对中国的“敌对行动”。476品论天涯网

多极化也被视为重塑国际关系的驱动力之一,中国认为原有世界格局主要由美国主导并受益。正如杨洁勉所观察到的,“国际力量的多极化是一个长期的、历史性的发展过程,在经济、政治、科技、文化、教育和舆论等长期以来仅由西方大国主导的领域,现在,东西方之间的国际影响力逐渐平衡,这才是开始。”西方学者也注意到西方力量的分化和世界各地崛起的大国日益强大。分析家们不再认为后单极世界的前景是不可思议的,而是对以两极化、多极化或 “无霸权 ”为特征的世界的影响进行辩论。476品论天涯网

While Chinese scholars describe the benefits that their country receives from a trend toward multipolarity, they also appear to recognize the challenges it brings. Fang Changping notes that multipolarity creates uncertainties for China in the security environment, particu-larly relating to the U.S.-China bilateral relationship: Multipolarity is advancing global interconnectedness in ways that support China’s goals of “peace and development” but is also giving rise to several new issues of instability, including rising global inequality, regional hot spot issues, and nontraditional security threats. The uncertainties in the security environment and development issues result-ing from regional multipolarization make Sino-U.S. relations a primary factor in deter-mining the stability of China’s peripheral and overall external security environments. In this understanding of multipolarity, Europe and the United States may remain friendly with one another, but would operate autonomously rather than as close allies. Other rising powers in the developing world, such as Brazil, India, or South Africa, could also play increas-ingly important roles in international politics.476品论天涯网

In short, some partnerships may grow weaker, while new ones may emerge for either China or the United States. This may result in a more dynamic and fluid set of international coalitions in a situation featuring intense U.S.-China rivalry and even conflict. Multipolarity could also allow China to expand its informal rela-tionships with countries outside the region, such as in Latin America. There are also risks that multipolar competition could become more destabilizing. One Chinese article notes that the United States is engaging in “technological and institutional innovation in pursuit of absolute military superiority,” while France, Germany, India, Japan, and the United Kingdom are rebal-ancing and optimizing the structure of their military forces. This, combined with advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and other military technologies, means that China’s military secu-rity is vulnerable to “technology surprise and a growing technological generation gap.”476品论天涯网

尽管中国学者描述了他们的国家从多极化趋势中获得的好处,但他们似乎也认识到了它带来的挑战。方昌平指出,多极化给中国的安全环境带来了不确定性,特别是与中美双边关系有关。多极化正在以支持中国 “和平与发展 “目标的方式推进全球相互联系,但也引起了一些新的不稳定问题,包括全球不平等的加剧、区域热点问题和非传统安全威胁。安全环境的不确定性和区域多极化带来的发展问题使中美关系成为威慑中国周边和整体外部安全环境稳定的主要因素。在这种对多极化的理解中,欧洲和美国可能会保持友好关系,但会自主运作,而不是作为亲密盟友。发展中世界的其他崛起大国,如巴西、印度或南非,也可能在国际政治中发挥越来越重要的作用。476品论天涯网

总之,一些伙伴关系可能会变弱,而中国或美国则可能出现新的伙伴(关系)。在中美激烈竞争甚至冲突的情况下,这可能会导致一系列更有活力和流动性的国际联盟。多极化也可能使中国扩大与本地区以外国家的非正式关系,如在拉丁美洲。多极化竞争也有可能变得更加不稳定。一篇中文文章指出,美国正在进行 “技术和制度创新,以追求绝对的军事优势”,而法国、德国、印度、日本和英国正在重新平衡和优化其军事力量的结构。这一点,再加上人工智能(AI)和其他军事技术的进步,意味着中国的军事安全很容易受到 “技术惊喜和日益扩大的技术代沟 “的影响。476品论天涯网

In a multipolar world featuring a China nearing global primacy, China and Russia could become close partners. There has already been an increase in military cooperation between the Chinese and Russian armed forces over the past several years. In June 2019 the two nations upgraded their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Chinese scholars generally anticipate that the bilateral relationship will grow even stronger. Over the next several decades, the two countries could expand the scope and scale of military exer-cises, increase joint air and naval patrols in the Indo-Pacific region and potentially in areas closer to Russia, and increase cooperation in sensitive defense fields such as strategic mis-sile defense, hypersonic technology, and nuclear submarine technology. Increased China-Russia cooperation could also seek to undermine arms control treaties, and this might accel-erate an arms race with the United States. If the U.S.- China competition were to turn hostile in the future, China and Russia could collaborate to support operations against the United States and its allies and partners along BRI routes. The two nations could be joined by others that have antagonistic relations with the United States, such as Iran and North Korea.476品论天涯网

The shift toward a multipolar international order raises the prospect of a more change-able and unpredictable geopolitical contest in which coalitions shift and partnerships grow or recede in unexpected ways. In such a coalition, Russia could play an especially prominent role. The United States would likely retain friendly relations with powerful entities such as the European Union and Japan, although the degree of alignment may differ. China’s appeal as a patron state could grow under conditions in which it had neared global primacy, because it would be better positioned to provide benefits to other countries. A China enmeshed in a global rivalry with the United States would also be highly motivated to cultivate international support. Embattled governments around the world burdened with domestic difficulties or confronting bitter feuds with their own rival states could appeal to Chinese patronage for assistance.476品论天涯网

A key factor that could determine the extent of China’s network of clients would be how much each country judged Chinese assistance to be more valuable and meaningful than what the United States could offer. This scenario assumes that U.S. power continues to experi-ence relative decline, to the point that its willingness or ability to furnish goods and benefits to its partners and allies had eroded considerably. In such a situation, some disillusioned U.S. allies and partners could decide to abandon their former patron in favor of a position of neutrality or even switch to a more lucrative Chinese patronage. Although countries might hope to remain neutral, autonomy could be difficult to sustain in the face of intense pres-sure from Beijing and Washington, both of which could be expected to demand some level of support in exchange for material benefits of any type. In many ways, this dynamic would simply replicate a historical pattern featuring an acutely polarized international system, such as occurred in the World Wars and between the United States and Soviet Union in the Cold War. The pattern goes back to the 1700s and 1800s in Europe, where many smaller states aligned themselves with powerful great powers partly in hopes of securing the benefits of patronage. Indeed, studies have found that a rapid expansion in the number of alliances and partnerships tends to precede wars among great476品论天涯网


在以中国接近全球主导地位为特征的多极世界中,中国和俄罗斯可能成为密切的合作伙伴。在过去几年里,中国和俄罗斯武装部队之间的军事合作已经增加。2019年6月,中俄两国将两国关系提升为 “全面战略伙伴关系”,中国学者普遍预计,双边关系将进一步加强。在未来几十年里,两国可能会扩大军事演习的范围和规模,增加在印度洋——太平洋地区和可能靠近俄罗斯地区的联合空中和海上巡逻,并加强在战略导弹防御、高超音速技术和核潜艇技术等敏感国防领域的合作。中俄合作的加强也可能寻求破坏军控条约,这可能会加速与美国的军备竞赛。如果中美竞争在未来转为敌对状态,中国和俄罗斯可以合作支持针对美国及其盟友和合作伙伴在一带一路沿线的行动。与美国有敌对关系的其他国家,如伊朗和朝鲜也可能加入这两个国家阵线。476品论天涯网



Elevated Risks from Regional and Global Competition476品论天涯网


A turn toward hostile rivalry (see Chapter Five) could result in a heightened risk of conflict at both the regional level and beyond. Currently, Chinese and Western scholars tend to regard the risk of war among the great powers as still relatively low. A 2017 RAND report assessed the prospect of war between China and the United States as unlikely, though the study did note an uptick in conflict risks. Similarly, a commentary by Chinese media outlet CGTN rejected as improbable the possibility of U.S.-China war, though it regarded some sort of proxy clash as slightly less unlikely. At the regional level China seeks more sway over its neighboring regions and promotes an order in which U.S. influence does not dominate.476品论天涯网

Both countries have outlined competing visions for the Asia-Pacific’s emerging economic, politi-cal, and security order. They continue to face risks of a military crisis over flash points related to Taiwan and the East and South China Seas. Chinese leaders have denounced U.S. alli-ances and protested U.S. surveillance flights along Chinese borders, the U.S. Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Operations, and other activities. Feuding extends to the global level as well; for example, China and the United States have stepped up disputes regarding trade and technolo-gy. Since the 2010s, China has sought more significant revisions of global rules and norms, both alone and in conjunction with Russia. In June 2018 Xi identified “leading the reform of the global governance system with the concept of fairness and justice” as one of the ten priori-ties for China’s diplomacy. In our scenario of Chinese near global primacy, the changes in the relative balance of power between China and the United States and their structural differ-ences at both the regional and global levels are the most fundamental drivers of a systemic war.476品论天涯网


中美两国都对亚太地区的新兴经济、政治和安全秩序提出了不同的看法,在与台湾和东海及南海有关的热点问题上,中美两国继续面临着军事危机的风险。中国领导人谴责美国的盟友关系,抗议美国在中国边境的监视飞行、美国海军的航行自由行动以及其他活动。中美争斗也延伸到了全球层面;例如,中国和美国加强了贸易和技术方面争端。自2010年以来,中国一直在寻求对全球规则和规范进行更重大的修订——无论是单独修订还是与俄罗斯共同修订。2018年6月,习近平将 “以公平正义理念引领全球治理体系改革 ”列为中国外交的十大优先事项之一。在我们设想的中国接近全球第一的情况下,中国和美国之间的相对力量平衡的变化以及它们在区域和全球层面的结构性差异是系统性战争的最根本驱动力。476品论天涯网



These geopolitical trends provide the general outlines of the geopolitical environment within which a hostile U.S.-China rivalry might emerge. The future geopolitical situation could fea-ture a more unstable international environment in which countries compete more aggres-sively for energy and other resources. A stronger China in partnership with Russia and other developing countries could face off against the United States and its allies and partners. A China nearing global primacy could have far greater international military presence and a larger group of military partners than it does today. Pervasive feuding at the regional and global levels raises the risk that conflict between China and the United States could spread beyond the Indo-Pacific to other regions around the world and in global domains including cyberspace and information technology. Table 2.1 shows the implications of key geopolitical factors for potential conflict.476品论天涯网


Military Trends476品论天涯网


Complementing our understanding of the geopolitical trends, analysis of anticipated devel-opments in warfare could illuminate how China and the United States might fight under a situation of Chinese near primacy. These trends go beyond traditional comparisons of forces; instead they involve military changes that are expected in coming decades and that could profoundly shape U.S.-China confrontation and conflict. Thus, we review a protracted great power war, society as a domain of warfare, concealment and stealth, gray zone operations, outer space as a contested environment, and war from a distance. As much as possible, we include perspectives from both Chinese and Western sources.476品论天涯网


The Heightened Risk of a Protracted Great Power War476品论天涯网


Some Western scholars argue that future conflicts between great powers would focus on waging a limited war, because seeking victory through unconstrained warfare would lead to catastrophic destruction. Conflict between great powers could thus be protracted. As used by these experts, the termprotracted warrefers to a form of conflict characterized by long duration and limited means and ends. Such a conflict would aim to avoid the escalatory risks476品论天涯网

of direct conventional war in favor of indirect conflict that blurs the line between military and nonmilitary domains. The potential for a protracted great power war is further increased by other trends discussed in this chapter, including the intensification of geopolitical competi-tion, conflict over scarce resources, and the resort to measures other than war to achieve secu-rity goals.476品论天涯网

One study from the Center for a New American Security concludes that for future conflicts, limited protracted wars could include “peacetime preparation that is likely to blur with protracted, sometimes domestic, internal security operations, peacekeeping and coun-terinsurgency or counterterror missions.” The study judges that “attacks will resemble raids” in that “armed forces will probably be deployed on the receipt of specific intelligence in highly mobile and exceptionally rapid operations.” These small-scale operations would address only local, immediate threats while leaving the broader struggle unresolved. This approach dif-fers from that of many previous great power conflicts, in which countries mobilized large numbers of troops and equipment to decide wars through major combat engagements.476品论天涯网

Frederick Kagan has argued that protracted war increases the possibility that states will incorporate economic warfare into their strategies to exhaust the opponent and degrade their will to fight. His and other studies highlight the importance of economics in protracted war. Adversaries could seek to disrupt trade and logistics in the initial stages of conflict and could carry out blockade operations and commerce-raiding operations during the more advanced stages of conflict. Given the rise of global logistics chains and just-in-time inventory systems, even small disruptions in the velocity of trade could trigger large-scale economic challeng-es. Although the risk of protracted conflict remains low in general, China’s growing mili-tary capabilities, robust nuclear inventory, and economic clout increase the likelihood that any prospective U.S.-China conflict could resemble a protracted war, a possibility we explore in more detail in Chapter Six’s low-intensity conflict scenario.476品论天涯网


“新美国安全中心”研究指出:对于未来的冲突,有限的持久战可能包括 “和平时期的准备工作与持久的、有时是国内的内部安全行动、维和和镇压叛乱或反恐任务相混淆”。研究报告判断,“攻击将类似于突袭”,因为 “武装力量可能会在收到具体情报后部署进行高度机动和特别迅速的行动”。这些小规模的行动将只解决局部的、直接的威胁,而不解决更广泛的问题。这种方法跟以前的许多大国冲突不同,在以前的大国冲突中,国家动员了大量的军队和装备,通过大规模交战来决定战争。476品论天涯网


Chinese scholars acknowledge the possibility of a great power war between China and the United States but regard it as unlikely. While they do translate and discuss Western writ-ings on protracted war, they have tended to downplay its relevance for China. A search for the termprotracted waron Chinese academic study databases turns up a handful of recent articles that used the term in a metaphorical of sense long-term struggle. An article published in the military newspaperPLA Dailyinvokes Mao Zedong’s classic workProtracted Warto suggest that China must adopt a new development pattern and avoid playing by rules set by the United States to advantage itself.476品论天涯网

Instead of seeing future war through the lens of pro-tracted war, Chinese military analysts tend to focus on four different kinds of conflicts that hey judge as more likely for the PLA: (1) a large-scale, high-intensity defensive war against a “hegemonic” country attempting to slow down or interrupt China’s rise; (2) a relatively large-scale, high-intensity anti-separatist war against Taiwan independence forces; (3) a medium- to small-scale and medium- to low-intensity conflict related to territorial disputes or Chinese near borders; or (4) small-scale, low-intensity operations intended to counter ter-rorist attacks, preserve stability, and/or preserve the regime.476品论天涯网

The acknowledgment of large-scale, high-intensity war against the United States is striking, but such sources do not explore the possibility in any depth, perhaps owing to political sensitivities. Instead these sources tend to refer to war in a general, abstract sense, unmoored from specific scenarios involving U.S. forces. Reflecting this tendency, the experts tend to emphasize the technological dimen-sions of “future war,” such as AI and systems-of-systems warfare featuring information sys-tems, long-range precision strikes, and advanced technologies. They do not discuss how the PLA would use these against U.S. forces in specific scenarios, however.476品论天涯网

中国学者即承认中美之间有可能发生大国战争,但又认为这种可能性不大。虽然他们确实翻译和讨论了西方关于持久战的著作,但他们倾向于淡化其与中国的相关性。在中国学术研究数据库中搜索 “持久战 ”一词,发现最近有几篇文章将该词用于隐喻长期斗争的意义。发表在军事报纸《解放军报》上的一篇文章引用了毛泽东的经典著作《论持久战》认为中国必须采取新的发展模式,避免按美国制定的规则行事,以获得自身的优势。(此处英文原文“Protracted War “有误,译为中文是《持久战》,显然外国军事学者对中国已故领袖毛泽东经典历史著作《论持久战》”道听途说“成《持久战》、英文即“Protracted War”,事实上,《论持久战》英文应为” On Persistent Warfare ”,译者注。)476品论天涯网

中国的军事分析家们可能无法从亲历战争的视角来看待未来战争,而是倾向于关注四种不同类型的冲突,即他们认为解放军更有可能:(1) 对试图减缓或阻断中国崛起的 “霸权 ”国家进行大规模、高强度的防御性战争;(2) 对台独势力进行相对大规模、高强度的反分裂战争;(3) 与领土争端或中国近边界有关的中、小规模和中、低强度的冲突;或(4) 旨在打击恐怖袭击、维护稳定和/或维护政权的小规模、低强度行动。476品论天涯网

承认对美国进行大规模、高强度的战争是引人注目的,但这些消息来源并没有深入探讨这种可能性,也许是由于政治上的敏感性。相反,这些消息来源倾向于在一般的、抽象的意义上提及战争,与涉及美国军队的具体情景无关。为了反映这种趋势,专家们倾向于强调 “未来战争 ”的技术层面,如人工智能和以信息系统、远程精确打击和先进技术为特征的系统战。然而,他们并没有讨论解放军将如何在特定情况下使用这些技术来对付美国军队。476品论天涯网

Society as a Domain of Warfare476品论天涯网


Increasingly, warfare is no longer solely confined to the military. The intersection of multi-ple emerging technologies, from surveillance technologies to AI, algorithms, machine learn-ing, and virtual reality, is creating the potential for aggressors to disrupt and manipulate the information-based foundation of society. As a result, the barriers between military and civilian, and between peacetime and wartime endeavors and responsibilities, are blurring. The potential economic devastation that could accompany such war could deter adversaries from escalating to this level. If deterrence failed, conflict could be waged between and among networks, targeting and disrupting the whole of society, according to Western analysts.476品论天涯网

As Robert Johnson, an Oxford University specialist in the changing character of warfare, observes, “Future forces will make use of stealth, systemically operating through communi-cations networks and through the exploitation of the vulnerabilities of society. They will use information warfare to spread fear and panic but also wage kinetic warfare on and among civilian populations. Their aim will be to destroy financial systems, infrastructure, and the willingness to sustain resistance.” China could also carry out information operations that target U.S. elections, political processes, and governmental institutions or that contribute to broader societal disruption and the shaping of U.S. public opinion.476品论天涯网

Chinese military analysts have written about society as a domain of warfare since the mid-2000s. Indeed, the concept is embedded within the PLA’s operational idea of informa-tion dominance, which asserts that the side with the information advantage will win the war. The idea that cybertechnology and information operations can be used in wartime to target civilian infrastructure and shape an adversary’s societal thinking has been discussed in authoritative PLA sources since at least 2009.The PLA’s Three Warfares concept, a doctrine that calls for employing military assets to wage public opinion and psychological and legal warfare, illustrates the importance China places on seizing the information initiative and continuously shaping the narrative in both peacetime and wartime, including use of informa-tion operations and propaganda campaigns to degrade adversary decisionmaking and mobilize support for China’s objectives.476品论天涯网

Developments consistent with this trend can already be observed in the activities of hack-ers, activists, and informal propagandists being employed by China or Russia as part of their disinformation campaigns and cyber activities against the U.S. government and busi-ness interests. Chinese export of surveillance technology around the globe further creates opportunity to disrupt information networks and collect data that can be used to shape information operations. As a result, any future conflict involving the PLA will almost cer-tainly not remain within the military domain. In addition to the geographic expansion of U.S.-China competition given the geopolitical patterns discussed in Chapter One, the com-petition, should it turn hostile, would likely broaden to include societal targets.476品论天涯网



自21世纪中期以来,中国军事分析家们就把社会作为战争领域来研究。事实上,这一理念已经深入到解放军信息主导权作战思想中,该思想认为拥有信息优势的一方将赢得战争。至少从2009年起,解放军权威人士就开始讨论网络技术和信息行动可以在战时用来攻击民用基础设施并塑造对手的社会思维。解放军的 “三战 “概念,即要求利用军事资源发动舆论战、心理战和法律战的理论,说明了中国在和平时期和战争时期都非常重视掌握信息主动权和不断塑造叙事,包括利用信息行动和宣传活动来削弱对手的决策,并动员人们支持中国的目标。476品论天涯网


Concealment, Stealth, and Proxy Wa r476品论天涯网


Along with the information-based societal disruption and the challenges that related activi-ties present, future conflicts appear poised to rely more on concealment or stealth. Accord-ing to scholars who analyze patterns of conflict, methods of stealth and concealment include smaller organizations, as opposed to large armies, operating from other countries or attempt-ing to remain concealed within populations or remote terrain. They also include “war by proxy,” where smaller groups and proxy actors assert the right to wage war, equipped with significant combat power. A technology trend, the “miniaturization of combat power,” enables smaller and more effective weapon systems with increased explosive power that can be carried by individuals. As Robert Johnson has observed, “The deduction of this trend is that every city, port and province is a potential battlespace.” The increase in the number of private security contractors and private military companies participating in security on behalf of states with interests overseas further illustrates this trend. Smaller, more dispersed, and well-armed groups make the conduct of proxy warfare easier, with nonmilitary or para-military groups and individuals trained and equipped by both state and nonstate actors.476品论天涯网

An illustration of this trend may be seen in China’s increasing reliance on the paramili-tary People’s Armed Police (PAP) to secure interests outside its borders, particularly in Cen-tral Asia and along the borders with such countries as Afghanistan and Tajikistan. China is also hiring private security companies, both foreign and Chinese, to protect overseas facto-ries and infrastructure projects in Africa and Central Asia. Furthermore, the use of proxy cybersecurity groups by China, including advanced persistent threat groups, many of which are contracted by the Chinese Ministry of State Security, is another means of concealment because these groups’ activities are often unattributable. These activities will continue and are even likely to increase as the U.S.-China competition tightens and China potentially expands its network of client states, particularly along the BRI.476品论天涯网

伴随着以信息为基础的社会破坏和相关活动带来的挑战,未来的冲突似乎将更多地依赖于隐匿或掩蔽。根据冲突模式分析学者观点:采取隐匿或掩蔽方法是较小的军事组织,而不是大型军队,在其他国家进行秘密行动或尝试在人群中和偏远地区隐匿行踪。“代理战争”,即规模较小的军事组织和代理行为者宣称有权发动战争,并配备了大量的“战斗力量”。当前的技术发展趋势,即 “战斗力小型化”使得个人可以携带更小、更有效的武器系统,并增加了破坏力。正如罗伯特-约翰逊所指出的,“这一趋势的推论是每一个城市、港口和省份都具有潜在的战斗空间。”私营保安承包商和私营军事公司(比如俄罗斯瓦格纳军事集团,译者注)的数量增加,代表有海外利益的国家参与安保工作,进一步说明了这种趋势。更小的、更分散的、装备精良的团体使代理战争更容易进行,非军事或准军事团体和个人由国家或民间机构训练和装备。476品论天涯网

这种趋势的一个例证是,中国越来越依赖准军事化的人民武装警察(武警部队)来保护其境外利益,特别是在中亚以及与阿富汗和塔吉克斯坦等国接壤的边境地区。中国也在雇用私营保安公司,以保护非洲和中亚的海外工厂和基础设施项目。此外,中国使用代理网络安全机构,应用技术先进的攻防手段,其中许多由中国国家安全部组织的——采取隐藏手段——因为这些机构的活动往往无法确定归属。随着中美竞争的加剧和中国有可能扩大其客户国网络、特别是沿着 “金砖倡议”路线继续进行相关活动并逐步增强力度。476品论天涯网

Gray Zone Operations476品论天涯网


The termgray zone operationsrefers to operations that seek to achieve military goals primarily through nonmilitary means or use coercion to achieve national objectives below the thresh-old of war. Gray zone activities involve contractor, paramilitary, and proxy forces to coerce adversaries without provoking a military conflict. They also include nonkinetic means such as information warfare, economic coercion, or cybersecurity activities. Gray zone operations have become more common since the early 2010s. They are cheaper than conventional forms of conflict and carry lower risk of escalation, yet have proven remarkably successful: Iran has used these tools to advance its interests in the Middle East, and Russia has used them in Eastern Europe. In addition, countries are gaining a larger gray zone “toolbox,” including capabilities in emerging technologies such as AI-enabled cyberlearning, machine learning, and unmanned vehicles that can coerce and intimidate without the presence of military forces. Though they are below the threshold of war, these operations can increase regional instability and the risk of escalation through miscalculation.476品论天涯网

Gray zone operations have played a pivotal role in advancing China’s interests in the East and South China Seas, as they have been used to further strengthen Chinese administration of disputed waters, island features, and resources. They also serve to establish Chinese civil-ian and military maritime presence as normal in the hope that the United States, regional nations, and the broader international community will accept China’s presence in disputed areas and hence its claims to those areas. While gray zone operations have occurred mainly in the maritime domain, they may provide a model of how China could pursue gray zone tactics on land—for example, in border disputes with India, where China has deployed a combination of military and civilian presence near or in disputed territory; gray zone forces include the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia and the paramilitary Chinese Coast Guard (CCG). Chinese literature also discusses use of AI and cybertechnology to enhance and shape information operations, which are used in gray zone conflicts. Given the relative success of gray zone operations in the Indo-Pacific region, China and the PLA will likely rely on gray zone actions and capabilities in future U.S.-China competition to support China’s objectives in other parts of the world and should conflict erupt.476品论天涯网

“灰色地带行动”主要指通过非军事手段来实现军事目标,或者使用胁迫手段来实现低于战争门槛的国家目标。”灰色地带行动“涉及承包商、准军事部队和代理军事组织,以胁迫对手而不挑起军事冲突。”灰色地带行动“还包括非军事手段,如信息战、经济胁迫或网络攻防。自2010年以来,”灰色地带行动“已变得更加普遍。它们比常规形式的冲突成本更低,升级的风险也更小,但已被证明非常成功:伊朗利用”灰色地带行动“来推进其在中东的利益——俄罗斯则在东欧如法炮制。此外,各国正在获得更大的灰色地带 “工具箱”,包括在新兴技术方面的开拓,如人工智能网络学习、机器学习和无人驾驶车辆,可以在没有军事力量存在的情况下进行胁迫和恐吓。尽管这些行动低于战争的门槛,但它们会增加地区不稳定和误判升级的风险。476品论天涯网


Cyberspace and Outer Space as Contested Environments476品论天涯网


Scholars also point to cyberspace and outer space as contested environments in conflicts over the coming decades. China and the United States already contend with each other in the cyber domains, and both sides have also built cyber-military units to defend their interests. While the United States has been the dominant player for decades in outer space through investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and satellite capabilities, future U.S. dominance is threatened as China and Russia improve their counterspace ties (i.e., employment of weapons to degrade or destroy space assets). In addition, the private sector is increasingly exploiting outer space for commercial use, including launching micro-satellites for imagery and communications purposes. This provides opportunities for other countries, including China, to capitalize on commercial technology—such as navigation and surveillance—that will improve the PLA’s global operations.476品论天涯网

China is actively investing in its military capabilities for outer space and cyberspace. The PLA has been modernizing its satellite communications infrastructure; space-based survey, mapping, and navigation systems; and an increasingly diverse range of space launch vehicles. China has a growing fleet of maritime surveillance satellites and dual-use oceanographic and hydrological satellites, as well as an expanding constellation of Beidou navigation satellites— all of which, Chinese scholars note, diminish China’s reliance on the U.S.-produced global positioning system. The Beidou constellation achieved global navigation coverage by 2020. These space-based capabilities are supported by infrastructure on the ground that ensures network connectivity, including spacecraft and space launch vehicle manufacture, launch, command and control, and data downlink.476品论天涯网

To address the increased vulnerability of space-based capabilities to attack, the PLA has also been developing counterspace capabilities, including an antisatellite capability that it tested in 2007 and 2014. An additional concern noted by Western experts discussing outer space as a contested warfighting domain is that China’s missile capabilities are undergirded by space-based surveillance and sensors that can work with over-the-horizon radars and other air- or ship-based sensors to find targets. Therefore, any future conflict involving China in which long-range missiles or hypersonic weapons come into play would likely spread to outer space. For any future low-intensity or proxy conflicts between the United States and China, space-based and navigational capabilities obtained from China by countries along the BRI digital Silk Road would augment the PLA’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and navigational capabilities, as well as providing intelligence and data-gathering capabilities to Beijing. This would potentially extend China’s ability to conduct military operations or support proxy forces in a future U.S.-China conflict.476品论天涯网




Long-Range Precision-Guided Munitions476品论天涯网


Another military trend noted by experts is that developments in long-range precision strike and multiuse platforms enables countries to place forces at risk from vast distances. New generations of antimissile technology and semiautonomous vehicles have spurred develop-ments in multiuse platforms that are able to operate on land, sea, air, and electronically. These enable an aggressor to conduct military operations without having to deploy forces close in, and it also increases the costs of response to the targeted country. China has made efforts to exploit this military trend through the diffusion of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and highly accurate extended-range delivery systems, such as bal-listic and cruise missiles. These include hypersonic antiship cruise missiles, as well as a robust inventory of ballistic missiles, many of which can be adapted to use hypersonic war-heads.476品论天涯网

The PLA also fields approximately 200–300 conventional medium-range ballistic missiles, which increase the range for precision strikes against land targets and naval ships operating out to and beyond the first island chain, and a series of nuclear and conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles that are road-mobile and increase the capability for near-precision strike as far as the second island chain. Conceptually, PLA scholars discuss target-centric warfare as part of their operational systems concept, which uses precision strike capabilities and intelligent munitions to paralyze an enemy’s operational system while limiting nontarget collateral damage. Increased integration of PGMs and other long-range missiles into the PLA’s arsenal means that the Chinese military could feasibly target U.S. forces and sup-porting client states from afar should the U.S.-China competition turn violent. However, the vulnerability of space-based and airborne ISR systems to both kinetic and nonkinetic strikes could mitigate, to some extent, the effectiveness of long-range strike capabilities.476品论天涯网





This section has examined future patterns of conflict and military developments that bear on the PLA’s approach to supporting Chinese primacy in the U.S.- China competition. These future patterns of conflict point to several common themes that are likely to affect such a competition. First, they will expand the competition, both geographically and into other domains, including outer space and society. Second, these developments point to a range of ways in which China can support proxy groups or client states through dispersion, conceal-ment and stealth, gray zone operations, and the use of cybertechnology and other emerging technologies to cause societal upheaval. These possible scenarios in turn potentially increase the possibility of low-intensity or proxy conflicts in a U.S.-China competition. Table 2.2 sum-marizes these military developments and their implications for potential U.S.-China conflict.476品论天涯网




This chapter has examined key geopolitical trends and patterns of conflict that are likely to affect the PLA’s support to Chinese primacy. Several implications arise from this discussion that will be discussed in the remainder of this report. First, the possibility of U.S.-China con-flict owes in large part to broad historical trends related to the changing balance of power between China and the United States. To date, both countries have ensured that the competi-tion remains peaceful. Although the current risk of conflict remains low, the possibility that tensions will escalate to hostilities cannot be fully discounted.476品论天涯网

Second, the broad geopolitical drivers raise the possibility that should U.S.-China com-petition turn hostile, Chinese cooperation with Russia could become even closer. The rise of the East also points to the possibility that China will be able to broaden the competition to other geographic areas by expanding its network of supportive client states in the developing world—most likely along BRI routes. This in turn could increase the potential for military crises and incidents involving China and possibly the United States across a much broader geographic region than is the case today. China’s deepening energy dependence could also lead to an expansion of Chinese military presence in Africa and the Middle East, which could provide Beijing with military options should a U.S.-China conflict erupt.476品论天涯网

The military trends discussed in this chapter carry important implications regarding the potential trajectory of U.S.-China conflict as well. The risks of escalation provide a strong incentive for the two great powers to resort to more indirect methods of fighting, including economic warfare, information operations, and cyberwarfare. The overlap of unsettled and disordered geographic regions with China’s pursuit of infrastructure development along the BRI, the competition for resources, and an emerging mode of war featuring the blurring of military and society in conflict and the involvement of nonuniformed forces raise the prospect of low-intensity proxy wars. Improvements in space-based capabilities could allow China to field forces farther away and bolster its confidence to carry out combat operations abroad. The long ranges of advanced PGMs and the advent of new technologies suggest con-flict could be waged at greater distances and also involve more dispersed forces.476品论天涯网



     【文/陶勇 翻译,本文为作者向红歌会网投稿】476品论天涯网

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